THE WAY OUT

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[PREFACE — THOUGHTS ABOUT STATES-COMMUNITY —
WHY MUST THE SEA HAVE A MASTER?]

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PREFACE.

The way out of the present hell can only be found by the cooperation of three political and social powers, n.l.

a. *The electors*, when they return to or accept the principles of the Cobden Club: *Peace, Free trade, Goodwill among nations;*

b. *The elected*, when they continue the work, inaugurated by Passy and Randal Cremer and organised in the Interparliamentary Union, and

c. *The governments*, when they continue the work inaugurated by the Russian Czar and organised in the Peace-Conferences.

The short essays, translated in this little volume show the next moves on the lines *b* and *c*. Their origin lies in a mandate of the Interparliamentary Union to a Commission for the preparation of the third Peace-Conference, consisting of Beckman, Lammasch, Slayden and myself, while the fifth member Kovalevsky died. As the war made the continuation of our collegial work impossible I continued it by myself alone and extended the mandate as will be seen in the reprinted essays. Evidently a lasting peace cannot be reached by military successes. They would be got by combinations of forces, which have no guarantees of being permanent. The combination, which considering the whole struggle may be the stronger, cannot shut the eyes for the hard

facts. Some conflict of interests among themselves may arise and in consequence *each of them would have to defend under quite other circumstances the results, which they owe merely to a powerful but casual cooperation.*

Supposing a durable understanding could be found on the lines indicated in the first essay, I think none of the States, who now sacrifice the best part of their male population and their financial power to an extent, that means for some depopulation and for all unbearable taxation when not bancruptcy, would continue the war for merely military guarantees, valuable only, when peace would mean armistice and preparation for a revanchewar.

Of course it is not my intention, neither favourable to my purpose to critisize, more than is strictly necessary, either of the belligerents, but it is indispensable to make here an objection against the policy of the entente. Mr. Asquith asserted repeatedly that the result of the war must be a durable understanding between the nations. Nevertheless he never gave even the outlines of that new international situation. Have the belligerents on the side of the entente some agreement among themselves about it? If so, would it not be of the highest interest for the whole world if its terms were published with the conditions, under which neutrals in the first place and in the second place each of the opposite belligerents are allowed to accede to this agreement, alliance, league, on whatever name may be in conformity with its terms?

Supposing it does not exist, the question arises, whether the neutrals, America in the first place ought

not to convocate a universal conference on the basis of the Peace-Conferences to discuss the international situation after the war. To continue slaughter and destruction in order to reach a permanent international peace, but leaving it a mere mirage and never stating its terms, seems to me irresponsible towards the peoples, of course the belligerents in the first place but also towards the neutrals who suffer less but sufficiently to look eagerly to a remedy.

They may and must leave the conditions of peace to the belligerents themselves, but the coming international situation is a common interest of all.

According to my mandate of the Interparliamentary Union I have tried to state the principal objects of such a Conference and I am glad to say that my essay found the entire approval of my colleague Lammasch. Also the Swedish member Beckman and our Secretary Lange declared their approval in general, though they did not think it opportune to favour its distribution by the Council of the Union to its members. This distribution I now take in hands myself. Of Mr. Slayden's general approval I feel sure, knowing his views and having discussed a large part of the contents in our meeting before the war.

To avoid misunderstanding I want to draw the special allention of my readers to the fact that the measures I propose form two quite distinct groups. To the first belong: *a:* the organisation of a permanent States-Council advising about international matters and preparing treaties and *b:* the conclusion of a general treaty on the line of the Bryan-Treaties.

To the second group belongs the discussion of the possibility of charging this council with some international administrations, especially of managing an international sea-police and of organising territories, i.e. new States as long as they are in embryonic form.

Only the first group can be the object of convocation of the Conference; extensions of this programme would of course lie in its own hands.

Finally I have to say a few words about the history of the essays themselves. The contents of these with many other matters have been originally published in my Dutch publications and have in this form attracted the attention of foreign journalists. Mr. Teuteberg's notice of them in the *Deutsche Revue* brought me in relation with its leader Mr. Fleischer who admitted my essay without alterations, but to whom I am bound to state here, that this did not mean full assent to every detail. The second essay forms the part which was translated from one of my Staatkundige Brieven (Political letters) in a larger article in the Easter Number of the *New York Tribune* by the American journalist Robert Mountsier, under the title „Why should the Sea have a master". This title I in my turn borrow from him.

No other objection against the contents of the Essays has reached my ear, than that I aim too far; to this I can only reply that if ever, here the proverb is applicable:

Great evils want great remedies,

The pre-war international condition in Europe was subject to difficulties, but these troubles were not proportionated to the bloody and costly sacrifices made nowadays to cure them. Passy's and Randal Cremer's idea in 1889 to summon all members of parliament for an endeavour to submit international disputes to arbitration instead of deciding them by force of arms, and to create a permanent court for that purpose, was not only beautiful but also very practical. They met with success. Gradually members of all parliaments in the world founded sections of this Union. The number of members of these sections varied in proportion to local circumstances.[1]) In 1912 their number was 3640, but the next year 300 less, most of these not being reelected (Report of the Hague Conference 1913, p. 11).

[1]) In a certain sense the spirit of a people is reflected hy the numerical strength of memhership of the Union. Having attended the London Conference of 1890, two memhers of the Union and I prepared a Dutch section. The president of the Netherland's Upper House Van Naamen van Eemnes and nearly all its memhers and the greater majority of the Lower House adhered to the newly formed section. Without any political considerations hoth the purpose of the Union and the fundamental idea of a society of nations were equally approved by all parties. This may explain too the spirit of the Dutch neutrality nowadays. The Dutch people do not helieve that a displacement of power in favour of one of the belligerent parties will benefit the community of nations. They feel inclined, at least since one generation to this peaceful community of nations and they wish it to be reestahlished as soon as possihle.

The Interparliamentary Union was in a certain sense a daughter of the Peace Societies and in the earlier years the experienced members of parliaments being at the same time members of the Union had always to point out the difference between the Union and the Peace Societies. The purpose of the Union was to further the *organization of nations* in behalf of peace; to establish *a spirit of peace in mankind* belonged to the task of the Peace Societies. Consequently the first meetings were chiefly consecrated to elaborate a scheme of a Court of Arbitration. The Union directed by the Belgian Senator Decamps had finished this task at the very moment the Czar of Russia unexpectedly summoned a Peace Conference (August 24th 1898). The elaborated scheme of the Union was placed without discussion on the order of the day of this Conference and adopted by it.

Since that moment the Union found no new task to consecrate its energies to. Therefore it became identical to a Peace Society, so much the more because the Peace Conferences were especially indicated to formulate the most practical scheme for a society of nations. The greater part of the Union's latter resolutions consequently only express wishes to the Conferences of the Governments.

But some of the resolutions which I will discuss here are relative to those Conferences themselves and to their future development.

Directly after the first Peace Conference wishes have been formulated in Christiania that future Conferences should have to put into practice as fully as pos-

sible the principle of a permanent Court of Arbitration. Later on, especially as result of propositions of the American Senator Bartholdt, the development of the Interparliamentary Union and of the Peace Conferences in the line of an international legislative power or International Parliament was subject of discussion. In London (1906) a report in general favourable to these propositions had been a point of consideration. However the efforts to create such a central legislative power did not meet with universal approval. After discussion the following more narrowly formulated resolution was adopted:

„That it would be advantageous to give the Hague Conferences a more permanent influence in the work of pacification, and that the powers should agree in establishing the periodical meeting of these Conferences. That the Powers, when appointing their representatives to the second Hague Conference, could usefully include in their instructions the duty of endeavouring to find the means of constituting a permanent consultative council entrusted with preparing the codification and development of international law" (Official Report p. 116).

When the preparation of the Third Peace Conference was in sight the Dutch section of the Union pursuited its studies in the above mentioned line and invited me to propose a resolution. This resolution aimed to procure a permanent organ to the Conferences without influencing their character of diplomatic conferences of independent States. A report of mine may be found in the Compte rendu of the Geneva meeting (1912) pp. 131—135. In the discussion I summarized the con-

tents of it in the following speech (pp. 254—255):

"In name of the Dutch section I propose to take a decision about a matter of much importance, viz. the organization of the Peace Conferences of the Governments. My proposition has not yet been worked out fully; it is only expressing a wish to our Council to which your agreement, I think, may be expected in advance.

"When you accept our proposition, our Council will nominate a commission for study, in order that the Hague Conferences may be analogous to the Interparliamentary Conferences. In any case has the necessity of the Peace Conferences' periodicity never been pronounced explicitly, but we need not doubt that public opinion is already regarding them as a permanent institution of international law. The committee for preparation of the Third Peace Conference will in fact tacitly or perhaps even expressly follow the same aim and develop itself to a Permanent Bureau of the Conferences. The facts are predicting it and the logic of events is tending to it.

„Nothwithstanding the aim being very simple and clear, many difficulties arise in connection to the composition of this Committee when putting it into practice. I call only your attention to the questions of number, nomination and competence of its members. The Interparliamentary Union has to use its influence in this matter as already in relation to many other affairs e.g. in behalf of the organization of a Court of Arbitration.

„As I observed in my report, we only intend to deal with a permanent organ of the Peace Conferences as they

have been hitherto, that is to say, Diplomatic Conferences of independent States. In this spirit we should wish the Commission that is to be entrusted with the report, to prepare the constitution of the permanent Committee and the Secretaryship of these conferences. We could not pass beyond the limits of this plan, without sterilising our work before it had been started. The Governments have traced out this limited task for the conferences and as far as I know the wish that it should be extended has never been expressed."

The proposal was adopted without any discussion and the Commission was nominated. It only met once and during this meeting the American delegate, Mr. James L. Slayden and myself, together with our secretary, Mr. Lange, went through the whole matter and considered it, partly with the help of a written answer to the questionary of Prof. Lammasch from Vienna. During the meeting at the Hague (1913) that report was not yet delivered and all further preparations were prevented by the outbreak of the war.

Nevertheless the reader will understand that I went on working at my plan and that I could not get rid of the thought whether it might not be possible to develop the proposed "Permanent Commission for the Preparation of the Peace Conferences" itself into a *permanent advisory body in regard to international matters*, — having a far more extensive task than was originally meant for it of course — whose influence might have a soothing effect on conflicts, arising in the future.

I have published the result of my investigations in my Dutch essays; it has met with a favourable reception in quarters that were acquainted with it in this way. None the less I gladly seize the opportunity to put it before the readers of this review and explain it to them briefly.

I have in view in the first place a College, which only advises and elaborates opinions and projects, but where — excepting resolutions about its own methods of working — no resolutions are voted by majorities. In conformity with these functions the College's name could be *Council of States for international affairs*. This States-Council ought to have a President or Presidential college for its own administration and a Secretary with the necessary assistants, all to be paid by all the participating States in a way, that the most prominent personalities could be found for these offices and permanently live at the seat of the Council in conformity with their high position. Election, term of office, admissibility of reelection etc. could be left to further agreement. Only the Presidency and membership of the presidential college must be absolutely independent from every individual State and therefore a member of the Conference elected as such, must cease to represent his State. To take part in the Conference those Governments are invited who were represented at the Peace-Conferences. These appoint so many members as, within certain limit, they may think convenient, but at their own expense, and in special cases they may give them experts as assistants. If more members are appointed one of them has to be desi-

gnated as first member. The sole, respectively the first representatives have to live at the seat of the council or so near it that the Presidency can convocate a general meeting within a couple of days at the very most. Plenary Conferences for definitive discussion meet as is usual for the Peace-Conferences, as far as material is prepared, also by publication, for final decisions. Here it may be remembered once more, that voting only takes place to give an easy and clear survey of the final instructions of the governments, not to bind minorities. Treaties only become binding by ratification.

In passing it may be remarked that the States-Council and its office may prove themselves also useful in matters, that are only of interest for some States, and simplify the actual ambages of the Chanceries.

To make this standing representative of the Conferences of use as mediator in conflicts, a single paragraph of a treaty would be sufficient, which would be also very useful to guard the peoples against dangerous resolves of military authorities, their own as well as those of others, namely a stipulation, that no State is allowed to commence any action by force whatever against another State or its subjcets, unless the claim be notified to the States-Council at least some weeks before. This extension of its field of action is already prepared by the Interparliamentary Union. At its meeting at The Hague of 4 September 1913 the following resolution was adopted unanimously which was proposed by the american group and recommended in

splendid speeches by Bartholdt and Burton (Compte rendu, p. 231—244 and 313—317):

"Whereas the President and Secretary of State of the United States have invited all the governments signatory to the Hague Convention to enter into treaty agreements with the governments of the United States, by which the High contracting Parties pledge themselves incase of any difference or controversy between them not to resort to hostilities untill an impartial investigation has been had; and

"Whereas these agreements would be clearly in the interest of international peace in as much as their adoption would greatly enhance the possibility of a peaceful settlement of all controversies between nations;

"The XVIIIth Interparliamentary Conference herewith heartily recommends to the governments the principle of these agreements.

"The Conference is of opinion that such agreements should form part of the task of the Commission on International Jurisdiction in order to facilitate the general application of the rules of these treaties."

At that moment there lay before the Conference a copy of a treaty between America and San Salvador (Compte rendu p. 313) of which kind at this time already more than twenty are concluded.

The States-Council could act as a permanent Committee of investigation.

In such a clause evidently lies a weapon against the great foe, whom it is difficult to define and still

more to fight with force, n.l. "*Militarism*". Militarism is not military force itself. Otherwise the States, which fight Germany for this evil, would now be subject to it themselves and even be proud of the stupendous development of this evil. The essence of militarism lies in the use of the military forces and in the ascendancy of military considerations in home and foreign policy.

Since there exist also on the field of destruction wonders of technic and organization, technical pride and a natural impulse not always to be contented with drilling and manoeuvres make this state of mind double dangerous.[1]).

But of the horrors of the real use of these wonders the whole world is now fully satiated, and it is I think prepared to limit the use of military forces in conformity with the proposed clause. Anyhow this seems to me indisputable, that warm support in favour of it may be considered as a proof that a State is not subject to militarism or if it has been is now profoundly healed by seeing the horrible consequences.

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[1]) Of the change in the notions about what is allowed or forbidden, just in this XXth Century, in favour of the technical progress the opinion about the throwing from the air of explosives offers a striking example. The first Peace-conference forbade it, it is true only for five years. The air-shipping developed rapidly, so the danger increased. But the airship as destructive engine came in favour at the same time. The second Peace-conference did not renew the prohibition. To promote a new humane regulation was the last work of the great pacifist Beernaert. His excellent report was discussed in the conference of Geneva and an almost unanimous resolution in favour of a renewal of the prohibition was adopted. A small minority whose eloquent representative was the Frenchman d'Estournelles de Constant, voted in favour of unlimited use of the technical wonder (Compte rendu, p. 121—130 and 257—352).

If the States-Council is once well in the saddle, it will surely ride well. It will only be an organ of moral force but are not at the end the moral forces the strongest?

But it is not excluded that once in existence as an impartial representative of the totality of the States, it can be entrusted by separate treaties with administrative functions, and that it will get control of the necessary forces to perform them well. I have specially in view two objects of administration *in spe*. Primo territories separated via facti from their own country and destined to become independent States. They are like the American territories and have to be educated to full independence. Who would be better entitled to their supervision than the States-Council, when it existed? And secondly the sea presents itself as an object of administration with a certain natural necessity and by force of actual circumstances.

The sea belongs only to the individual States as far as the territorial waters reach; for the rest it is *res nullius*, by its nature destined for common use for transport, fishing and amusement. Naturally it has also been used for other than peaceful objects. In the course of times it has also seen piracy, limitations of trafic and battles. The battleship became a means of power to rival States. The law of nations has tried to put order on this matter in war and peace and to limit the use of warships. The Interparliamentary Union has done its best to extend these limitations further in the direction of *a*. entire inviolability of private property at sea; *b*. limitation of the right of blockade; *c*. limitation of the qualification of contraband to objects

really destined to be used in war; *d.* limitation of the destruction of ships with contraband as cargo. I can refer here to the reports of the conferences of Bern (1892) the Hague (1894), Christiania (1899), and especially of London (1905) and Brussels (1910).

In the present war all what was considered as law with all projects of reform is overthrown, in a way that it literally does not exist anymore. For the qualification as contraband the leading principle has been wholly abandoned, that war is not a struggle between the peoples themselves but between their military organisations and that consequently only what serves these in their work is means of war and therefore contraband. The notions of blockade and siege are extended so far, that *de facto* whole neutral states are included in the blockaded or besieged territories. The rights of the neutrals and the mail-service are restricted just as pleases the strongest sea-power. Only the casual constellation between the powers is cause of all these proceedings. It would be, I think, highly unprobable, that France, Russia, Italy and Japan should admit as law against themselves in future what England now practises. Provisionally however law at sea is what pleases England.

Then there is the new battleship, the submarine, to overthrow the actual balance of maritime power. Not yet at this moment; but one ought to consider what situation will arise when the whole world will swarm with these implements of war which are relatively not expensive. England may extend its rights in a wholly unlimited way with regard to their relations

with the now weaker States; but when once all waters will be full of submarines, real use of power, a real *rule the waves* will be impossible. The Englishman who doubts it may suppose for example all islands and creeks of the Mediterranean crowded with submarines!

International administration of the sea is the only means to restore a situation favourable to the peaceful work of the nations. It is indispensable to go back to the fundamental principle, that the sea as *res nullius* has to be brought under international rule and police, of course with provisions for States, of which the different parts are separated by the sea. It is the only way out of the present hell and the only escape from its increasing horrors.

Special attention should be given here to straits and canals between seas. The member of the German Diet Pachnike has introduced this matter in the Interparliamentary Union, and the Portuguese member de Penha Garcia has elaborated an excellent report on this subject. (Compte rendu of the conference at the Hague of 1913, p. 51—105 and 175—193). The necessity of extending the new regulations also to these straits and canals is evident when attention is fixed f. e. on the situation of Russia, which through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles can reach the Mediterranian but is then, just as the adjacent powers themselves locked up behind a canal, made by man on one side and a strait under the control of England on the other.

Of course everybody will ask at once: But England? My answer is: try! Why could not England be contented with a leading position in the international po-

lice? As its worldpower is composed, it cannot allow any other power to get the stronger at sea; in this claim to superiority England is right. But to attain without sacrifices and struggles the same guarantees for its interests must be acknowledged as the better way, not only by the disciples of Cobden and Bright, but also surely by the taxpayer, who in England will find the screw without end as it will prove to be in the future, as hideous as in other countries.

It will be a real relief for the whole world, not to have to pay any more for fleets and to limit its expenses to what is wanted by a moderate contribution for the sea-police. Only the taxpayer may not be too close in order not to engender, I fear a too big foe. He may be generous with pensions!

The author submits this sketch of a new order of things to the approval of the nations. It is drawn in conformity with the principles of the historical school. It joins directly to the outcome of history and the projects of reform prepared by thousands of members of parliaments. This order of things once existing, one would scarcely feel any change, while in reality this great change would have been made, that a new and powerful organ of moral and legal considerations would have changed the balance of power in favour of such considerations in a degree that a durable peace, when of course not absolutely guaranteed, would become highly probable.

The Hague, June 1916.

As long as war at sea was limited to efforts to damage their respective men-of-war and to make profit by seizing merchant ships, the acknowledgment of the inviolability of private property at sea seemed sufficient as the keystone of the efforts of the pacifist movement. If it brought no profit England's interest in supremacy at sea would diminish, and if no damage were feared for tradesmen from the other side acquiescence in England's majority would be possible.

This war has shown that England's majority is dangerous in another way. Till the present war England claimed to want a paramount war-fleet only in order not to be exposed to the danger of being unable to secure sufficient food in time of war. That any great Continental country could be starved may have been thought theoretically possible; practically it was not feared. Otherwise Germany could have easily made herself a storehouse of food, which would have prevented England's starving project. Every one who wishes that the coming peace may stop the causes of war has to take into account this new use of England's majority. By the acknowledgment of the inviolability of private property at sea alone could not be made impossible for the future that England, by its enlarged

definition of contraband, should continue to have the power to cut off the food supply of every country with insufficient production of its own.

At the same time the assault of he Allies upon the Dardanelles brings to the front the question of the power over straits and maritime canals. Russia tries at once openly to get the possession of these straits and wishes the Allies to put in her hands this key to the Black Sea, also the key to the Danube. The opening of the dispute over the Dardanelles, of course, draws the attention to other questions of the same sort. At once it appears that Russia can scarcely be contented in the future by the possession of the Dardanelles; she wishes access to *the* sea, but she comes through the Dardanelles to only *one* sea, the Mediterranean, whose two keys, Gibraltar and the Suez Canal, are in the hands of England. Looking at this matter from another aspect, not only Austria and Turkey, but also Italy, Greece and the Mediterranean parts of France and Spain must feel the more how impotent they are against England if ever she uses to the extreme the power which this situation confers.

Germany continues the present war effectively with submarines, of which she has a majority, and Germany claims in an officious publication that she wages this war not only for herself, but on behalf of all weaker seafaring nations! This expression from German authorities as to their intentions may contain some comfort for the weaker powers, but there is also the possibility

that the creation of a German fleet, greater than England's, would only result in her succeeding the English as masters of the sea. If such should prove to be the case the weaker States would gain nothing. It must be acknowledged that the use England has made of her power in the last century, taken as a whole, has been such that, supposing one of the great powers has to be master of the sea, England would be chosen; certainly in preference to Germany.

But with the other nations, the United States included, the first question remains, nevertheless: is it necessary that the sea belong practically to one power, and has there to be one master? They naturally answer this question in the negative. As a basic principle of international law, the sea belongs only to the adjacent states as regards the so-called territorial water; for the rest it is *Res nullius*, free for all. Nobody is entitled to be master there, or to play there the master. The sea is open for all to navigate and to fish in, and conflicts while using the sea for these ends must be prevented by a common sea-police.

The origin of all trouble at sea is the war-fleets themselves, their mutual rivalry, their taking and destroying of the merchant ships of others, finally the measures they arrogate to themselves against the neutral ships.

A permanent world peace requires obviously more incisive measures than those which have been advocated by the Interparliamentary Union. This worldwide peace, to be lasting, can best be brought about by the

acknowledgment and application of the three following principles:

1. That the sea is free, belonging to no nation.

2. That the sea is only for the common use of all peoples for peaceful purposes.

3. That this use and the use of straits and maritime canals as means of access to it be secured upon an equal footing for every nation by an international sea-police.

An international fleet would bring to an end the necessity of coast defence, for attacks from the sea side would be impossible, and the transport of military forces would be as far as needed under the control of the international sea-police. It would liberate the powers who compete for the majority at sea from a burden which is already heavy and threatens to get unbearable if continued in the present way.

The international sea-police would also liberate them from a moral burden. Even more than the war on land the present sea-war renders men inhuman. Think out in its details the possibility of their starving women, children and aged men, forcing the German soldiers to lay down their arms, to deliver their fleet and to become themselves unarmed helots of French and Russian rulers. These inhuman demands render inhuman those to whom they are made. Every Englander who condemns, and rightly condemns, the present action of the submarines may keep in mind that this form of war is an answer to his own unjust and arbitrary definition of food not destined directly for armed forces as contraband. Unless there are made new gene-

ral rules, as indicated heretofore, all States will have to compete *bon gré mal gré* for superiority up and under the sea. For none of them is this an attractive task.

Has an international regulation providing for this police-fleet a chance to be accepted? I answer with a counter-question: Why not, if it is good and relieves all peoples of a heavy burden?

But will England give up her supremacy on the sea by free assent? This question England will have to answer herself. Those who support a new organization which leaves England equal rights with all others are not bound to give up their plans because England may possibly oppose them. England is equally oppressed by the costs of her mighty position, and this position would become much more difficult if she opposed a new organization against the unanimous wish of all others.

And the free co-operation of England—why would not that be possible? England varies also in her international policy. It has followed a line which for England has been reactionary. The policy which became paramount with the abolition of Cromwell's mercantile laws and of the corn duties, commonly called that of Cobden and Bright, has temporarily lost its ascendancy by the treason of Chamberlain. By 1906 it was restored to power. The formation of the Campbell-Bannerman ministry was a change of play as well as of players. English public opinion in the party that secured control of its government was anti-military. She wished reduction of the costs of the navy and friendly relations with other countries. Unhappily she was from

the beginning hindered in her policy by the naval policy of Germany, which though it did not build more than two-thirds of the number of warships constructed by England, ignored the fact that the party in power in England built her three-thirds not of her own free will, but only to maintain this proportion against Germany.

Under the influence of these circumstances the cosmopolitan and pacific party in the ministry weakened, and the national egotistical spirit, represented by the House of Lords and the Unionist party, became ascendant. So it came that war was seized as a means to destroy the imminent competition for the mastery of the sea.

Nevertheless, nobody can say what England will do should Germany, Russia and other nations adopt in principle that freedom of the sea without any other navy than an international police-fleet. It would surely be accepted as an abandonment by Germany of the important expression of its "militarism", because of which the official English press says the war was begun.

The immense extension of the present war, the inhumanity of the ways of waging war and the still more atrocious situation which will arise if all peoples continue in rivalry to make technical processes subservient to mutual destruction, require from the friends of peaceful negotiation and the co-operation of the peoples equally drastic means of common action.

It gets more and more clear for all that the matter is no more some small displacement of power, but the continuation or ruin of our entire civilization.